The Evolution of "Boko Haram" (2)

It seems Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda was instrumental in persuading late President Yar’adua to curtail the menace of “Boko Haram”. Yuguda having decamped from PDP to ANPP, duly won the governorship in 2007. He subsequently became Yar’adua’s son-in-law, and returned to the PDP, possibly losing some political goodwill in the process. He may have dreaded returning to the electorate in 2011 with “Boko Haram” roaming free in Bauchi! I have previously noted that having fallen out with the sect, then Borno governor Modu Sherrif was also eager to see off Boko Haram. When security forces turned on “Boko Haram” between July 26 and 29, 2009, they responded in a surprising manner-in Maiduguri, they exacted “revenge” in a perverse manner by turning on the nearest Christians! While under attack from the army and police, Muhammed Yusuf ordered his followers to capture hundreds of Christians. The male captives had a simple choice-renounce your faith or die! For the females, it was renounce your faith or stay as captives, meaning slavery, servitude or worse! The worst treatment was reserved for Christian clergymen-three pastors were be-headed, with the executioners shouting “Allah Akbar” in wild celebration accompanied by celebratory gunfire. Pastor George Orjih of Goodnews Church, Wulari, Maiduguri was one of the three. Muhammed Yusuf personally urged him to renounce his faith and live, which the Pastor rejected and instead actually preached to Yusuf to accept the Christian salvation! Incensed, Yusuf ordered his immediate slaughter! Fortunately for most of the captives, government prevailed in that confrontation, so most of them were released after Yusuf’s capture. Once it launched its Jihad in 2010, Boko Haram has had four categories of targets-specific Islamic clerics who disagreed with its teachings or methods; government and security institutions and personnel; institutions which they considered abhorrent to Islam particularly hotels and beer parlours; and Christians and/or Churches. It is easy to understand why they would attack the first three groups-opposing Islamic clerics could potentially undermine their theology and legitimacy; government and security agencies had attacked them and killed their leaders; the disdain Moslems are supposed to have for alcohol and prostitution is well-known. The resort to targeting Churches and Christians, who till then had played no part whatsoever in this essentially intra-Muslim quarrel was inexplicable-the then president, governors of all states in which BH were attacked, the then National Security Adviser, etc, all being Muslims. The trend of BH attacking Churches and Christians has since accelerated, rather than decline culminating in the Christmas day 2010 attacks on Churches in Jos; 2011 bombing of the Madalla Church and killings in Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Borno, Bauchi, Niger and Plateau States. As previously stated, one can observe a clear transition from BH when it was pre-occupied with local politics in the North-East and Kano, and the newer version which seems to have a national or even international agenda (evidenced by the attack on the UN headquarters). It is clear that BH has been influenced by Nigerian politics in general, and the North-South power struggle that ensued after Yar’adua’s death in particular. Indeed it is possible to interpret their January 2 2012 ultimatum on Southerners to leave the North in explicit political terms-perhaps an attempt to reverse the April 2011 scenario in which a Christian Southerner obtained twenty-five per cent of the votes or more in most Northern states! One could also draw a parallel between the objectives of this ultimatum and the post-election violence which erupted across Northern Nigeria last April. Northern politicians such as Adamu Ciroma, Lawal Kaita, Yahaya Kwande, Muhammadu Buhari and Atiku Abubakar had made statements which may have contributed towards creating an environment conducive to or indifferent to political violence. Changes in Boko Haram’s methods and activities (such as suicide bombing) also suggest a link-up with Al Qaeda. The body language of some Northern leaders (such as Borno elders who spoke out only whenever government took military action and the initially tepid response of the Northern establishment) while not establishing complicity with BH, indicated at least mixed emotions! The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) very recently issued a shocking statement claiming falsely that BH’s ultimatum was in response to an earlier one issued by the “South-South”, in effect justifying same! The most blatant justification of BH has however been the one by CBN governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi who claimed to the Financial Times, that the BH phenomenon was a consequence of divergent federal resource flows to the South-South and North-East since the 13 per cent derivation principle in 1999! Sanusi ignored any facts that contradicted his logic-Cross-River and Edo States (both in South-South) which get next-to-nothing from derivation should then be consumed by terrorism; South-West and North-Central States who do not benefit from derivation haven’t shown the same tendency; the South-East zone actually receives lower federal allocations than North-East; and how does Sanusi explain pre-1999 religious riots in the North (when Northern States took the highest allocations based on population figures) including the 1980 Maitatsine crisis, or the 1995 beheading of Gideon Akaluka in Kano? I recommend that anyone interested in resolving the crisis of poverty, unemployment and ignorance in the North, should seek the solution in education, skills acquisition, focus on economic development and avoidance of extremist religious philosophy! The BH crisis has its roots in a dangerous combination of extremist religious ideology, abysmal social conditions and political brinkmanship!!!